Tolerance: Should We Approve Of It, Put Up With It, Or Tolerate It? by Schwartz, Barry
Swarthmore College 
Works 
Psychology Faculty Works Psychology 
5-1-1996 
Tolerance: Should We Approve Of It, Put Up With It, Or Tolerate It? 
Barry Schwartz 
Swarthmore College, bschwar1@swarthmore.edu 
This work is brought to you for free and open access by . It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty 
Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact myworks@swarthmore.edu. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-psychology 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
Barry Schwartz. (1996). "Tolerance: Should We Approve Of It, Put Up With It, Or Tolerate It?". Academe. 
Volume 82, Issue 3. 24-28. DOI: 10.2307/40251476 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-psychology/180 
  
Tolerance: Should We Approve of It, Put up with It, or Tolerate It?
Author(s): Barry Schwartz
Source: Academe, Vol. 82, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1996), pp. 24-28
Published by: American Association of University Professors
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40251476
Accessed: 25-09-2017 18:43 UTC
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
American Association of University Professors is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Academe
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:43:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 TOLERANCE:
 Should We
 Approve of It,
 Put Up with It,
 or
 Tolerate It ?
 By Barry Schwartz
 GOOD LIBERALS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY-
 and especially as citizens of that bastion of liber-
 alism, the academy - we value tolerance. We
 try to instill tolerance in our students as we
 teach them to respect differences among people
 and among groups. We try to practice it our-
 selves. And we reserve our strongest condemnation for individuals
 or institutions that are intolerant. We deeply believe that toler-
 ance is the one virtue of character on which a liberal, pluralistic
 society most depends. Liberal society can survive dishonesty. It
 can survive disloyalty. It can survive (and may even encourage)
 selfishness. But it can't survive intolerance. Indeed, as philosopher
 John Rawls has suggested, liberal society may even have invented
 tolerance as a practical feature of social life. Before pluralistic, lib-
 eral societies demonstrated that the successful practice of toler-
 ance was possible, it was "natural to believe, as the centuries-long
 practice of intolerance appeared to confirm, that social unity and
 concord requires agreement on a general and comprehensive reli-
 gious, philosophical, or moral doctrine." We now know better,
 and we can be proud of our collective tolerance. It may be liberal-
 ism's finest achievement.
 Before we get too proud, however, it may be a good idea to take
 Barry Schwartz is the Dorwin P. Cartwright Professor of Social Theory and
 Social Action in the psychology department at Swarthmore College.
 a closer look at what tolerance actually is. The dictionary tells us
 that to tolerate is "to allow what is not actually approved." So
 when we say we tolerate something, we are implying a negative
 judgment about it. We are saying, in effect, that we wish it wasn't
 ther , but for one reason or another we aren't prepared to do any-
 thing to stop it. This understanding of tolerance may cast it in a
 somewhat le s favorable light, because at the same time that we
 are allowing something to occur, we are being judgmental - we
 are being disapproving. Is this what we mean to say when we say
that we tolera e different lifestyles, different family arrangements,
 a d different religious beliefs and practices - that they aren't as
good as ours, but they aren't so bad that we should expend our en-
 ergy to stop them?
 I don't think so. I think that most of the time what we have in
 mind when we speak of tolerance is something closer to "accep-
 tance," or even "celebration." Acceptance implies approval, and
 elebra ion implies enthusiastic approval. This is closer to what we
 ave in mind when we teach our students to be tolerant. "They're
 just as good as we are, only different" is what we want our stu-
 dents to learn.
 Perhaps to say that tolerance implies either disapproval on the
 one hand, or acceptance on the other, is an overstatement. Per-
 haps tolerance implies little more than indifference (I say "little
 more" than indifference because when one is truly indifferent
 about something, the issue of tolerance doesn't even arise; in
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 gious, philosophical, or
 moral doctrine."
 order for tolerance to be relevant, one must at
 least find what is being tolerated relevant to one's
 life in some way). Thus I tolerate people who op-
 pose abortion just as I tolerate people who sing
 the praises of country music (which I can't bear).
 In this view, to tolerate is to put up with, and
 while that might imply distaste, it implies neither
 approval nor disapproval. However, tolerance as
 "putting up with" is not adequate. It is extremely
 important for us to preserve a notion of tolerance
 that is neither "putting up with," which demands
 too little of us, nor "acceptance," which demands
 too much.
 The examples of attitudes toward abortion and country music
 can help show why the distinctions between tolerance, putting
 up with, and acceptance should be preserved. It is easy to imag-
 ine that while I simply dislike country music, I disapprove of
 views that oppose legalized abortion. It doesn't require much to
 live with things one merely dislikes. I might avoid contact with
 country music as much as I can, but the- fact that other people
 seek it out and like it is of no real consequence to me. It does no
 violence to any of my core beliefs or ethical commitments.
 "Putting up with" country music is good enough; nothing more
 is needed. Anti-abortion beliefs are another story. I don't regard
 attitudes toward legalized abortion as a mere matter of taste; they
 are a matter of moral principle. To "put up with"
 anti-abortionists in the way I put up with country
 music is to obliterate this distinction between mat-
 ters of taste and matters of principle. And to "ac-
 cept" anti-abortionists is to deny that I deeply dis-
 approve of that position. To treat tolerance as the
 equivalent of putting up with is to ignore the dis-
 tinction between morally significant and morally
 insignificant differences. And to treat tolerance as
 the equivalent of acceptance is to ignore the differ-
 ence between agreement and disagreement. Thus,
 as philosopher Hans Oberdeik has suggested, toler-
 ance is required when there is deep diversity of beliefs, practices,,
 religious commitments, and even entire ways of life, and when
 some people actually disapprove of the beliefs, practices, religious
bel efs, and ways of life of others. Note what this requirement of
 disapproval implies: that we believe that some person or group
has beliefs or practices that are incompatible with ours and unac-
 ceptable. That is, we believe that this person or group would be
 notably improved if it adopted our beliefs and practices. Never-
 hel s, we restrain ourselves from acting on our own beliefs so
 that the "offending" person or group can continue to act on
 theirs. The beliefs and actions of committed anti-abortionists
 challenge us to be tolerant precisely because we find them repug-
 nant and deplorable.
 The dictionary tells us
 that to tolerate is "to
 allow what is not actu-
 ally approved."
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 This characterization of tolerance makes it seem challenging
 enough that one might ask if it's worth it. Why tolerate beliefs,
 practices, and ways of life that one judges to be morally unaccept-
 able? Why not make it as hard as possible for anti-abortionists
 to exhort others to share their views, especially when they show
 so little tolerance themselves for people whose views they find
 objectionable?
 Today, when any discussion of values is treated with suspicion,
 it is tempting to answer this question by appealing to relativism or
 skepticism. The reason to tolerate the beliefs and practices of oth-
 ers is that there is no right or wrong (relativism), or if there is one,
 there is no way to know what it is (skepticism). If people actually
 believed this, they would have to tolerate anti-abortionists be-
 cause they would either have no grounds at all for criticizing that
 position/ or their grounds would be nothing more than personal
 preference ("I think abortion should be legal, don't you?"). A
 skeptical defense of tolerance is essentially a negative defense; peo-
 ple tolerate others only because they have no grounds for being in-
 tolerant. Among its problems, it is hard to know how from a skep-
 tical point of view tolerance itself co\x\A. be justified as a worthy
 stance to take toward other
 people.
 A more compelling and pos-
 itive defense of tolerance is
 available, deriving from the
 writings of John Stuart Mill in
 the last century and amplified by Joseph Raz in
 the current one. Mill justifies tolerance by ap-
 pealing to the view that people should have au-
 tonomy to be the authors of their own lives. It is
 good and important that people should find their
 own way to the best way of life. Tolerance en-
 courages people to find their own way, though it
 obviously leaves open the real possibility that
 they will fail. The importance of autonomy must
 be elaborated by two additional points. First,
 there are many distinctive, worthwhile, yet in-
 compatible ways to live. These alternatives are
 much more than mere matters of taste; they are
 morally significant and engender deep commit-
 ments, and even sacrifices, on the part of their
 practitioners. And second, no person is an island.
 Acknowledging that people are autonomous does
 not mean that they can live apart from a mean-
 ingful community. Thus, to enable individuals to
 be the authors of their own lives requires that we
 tolerate groups they can join whose beliefs and
 practices they find compelling. If we believe that
 people should be the authors of their own lives,
 that people depend on membership in moral
 communities to live fully human lives, and that
 incompatible, worthwhile ways of life are possi-
 ble, then it is our duty to be tolerant. Thus, we
 must acknowledge that a commitment to oppose
 legal abortion that stems from, say, certain reli-
 gious views, is a morally significant and worth-
 while commitment, even if it includes beliefs and practices, like
 opposition to legal abortion, that we find unacceptable.
 To summarize the argument thus far, to tolerate something is
 neither to accept it nor merely to put up with it. People put up
 with things when they really don't care much about them, and
 they accept things when they agree with them. In contrast, when
 people tolerate things, they permit them to occur even though they
 do care about them and they disagree. Thus, people can accept, or
 perhaps celebrate, that (some) anti-abortionists are deeply commit-
 ted to the doctrine of universal love, and people can put up with
 their observance of Christmas as a national holiday. But people
 must tolerate their stance on abortion. And tolerance is good and
 important not because of skepticism about human values, but be-
 cause of a positive conception we have of how people should live
 and what they need to flourish. If we are going to be serious about
 a commitment to autonomy and social connectedness, we have no
 choice but to disagree with things and to tolerate them.
 Tolerance and Critical Engagement
 CAN ONLY TOLERATE THINGS OF WHICH THEY
 PEOPLE disapprove. Indeed, "disapprove" may be too mild. People may be disgusted by and disdainful of practices they tolerate.
 They may despise them. Yet,
 they tolerate them, because they
 acknowledge and respect the
 importance of these practices to
 the way of life of the people who
 engage in them, and because
 they respect that way of life, as a morally informed
 way of life, even if it's not informed by the morality
 they favor.
 So if people tolerate a practice or a way of life,
 what then do they do about it? They surely can't em-
 brace it, for to embrace it would be to accept it, and
 they don't accept it. But they also can't ignore it, for
 to ignore something that is of central importance to
 someone else is demeaning and disrespectful. What's
 left is to criticize it. To criticize a practice or a way of
 life is simultaneously to acknowledge its importance
 and its unacceptability. To do any less is to fail to
 take the practice and the people who engage in it se-
 riously. The only way to show respect for a way of
 life of which we disapprove is through active critical
 engagement. But note what kind of society this "re-
 spect" produces: an interactive, conflictive, "judg-
 mental" society. And note the problems it creates for
 those who strive to be tolerant and for those who are
 being tolerated. The tolerated face being told that
 their way of life is defective in a significant way. This
 is not an easy thing to have to hear. And the tolerant
 are forced to support something with which they
 strongly disagree, out of respect for its importance to
 other people who are struggling to be the authors of
 their own lives.
 To appreciate how hard this is, think about some
 concrete examples. Suppose you think that a
 monogamous relationship organized around the
 bearing and nurturing of children should be a part
 of a fulfilled human life. Tolerance now demands that you con-
 front and criticize your friends who are single or childless by
 choice. Suppose you think that while homosexuality is not an
 Tolerance as "putting
 up with," is not ade-
 quate. It is extremely
 important for us to
 preserve a notion of
 tolerance that is
 neither "putting up
 with," which demands
 too little of us, nor
 "acceptance," which
 demands too much.
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 abomination, it isn't important enough in the grand scheme of
 things to become1 the central part of a person's identity. Toler-
 ance now demands that you confront your gay friends and tell
 them, at the very least, that they are making too much of their
 sexual orientation. Tolerance similarly demands
 that you tell your black friends that their sepa-
 ratism is destructive and their Afrocentric view of
 history is a fiction (if that's what you believe),
 that you tell your Catholic friends that their po-
 sition on abortion is wrong, and that you tell or-
 thodox Jews that their treatment of women is
 abhorrent.
 This kind of critical engagement is not what or-
 dinarily comes to mind when people think about
 tolerance; people typically think that tolerance de-
 mands that they not be judgmental. I am suggest-
 ing that the opposite is true. This understanding
 of tolerance hardly conjures up an image of a
 world that is peaceful and harmonious. If this is
 what tolerance demands, who wants it?
 One answer to this question that has become in-
 creasingly clear is that minority groups don't want
 it. It may once have been good enough for these
 groups to be tolerated. But nowadays, tolerance has \
 become intolerable. What these groups now de-
 mand is not tolerance but acceptance - célébra- ;
 tion. "Who are you to 'tolerate' me? Who are you ;
 to say that my way of life is inferior to yours? Who ;
 are you to judge?" We can hear these sentences <
 even as we imagine suggesting to someone whose j
 practices we tolerate that he or she should be living ;
 differently. Fifty years ago, perhaps, when the pos- ;
 sibilities for Jews in America were tolerance (not ■
 tolerance really, but putting up with) or intoler- ;
 ance, tolerance was plenty good
 enough. "You don't have to ap-
 prove of us or even respect us.
 Just leave us alone, let us use a
 little corner of your field, and
 we'll stay out of your way. Even
 if you don't let us into your
 prestigious universities and professional schools, as long as you
 don't bother us, we'll make do." But now? Imagine the anger that
 would rise up if someone were to tell you that your dietary prac-
 tices were silly superstitions, your God was vengeful, and your re-
 fusal to accept Jesus Christ would damn you to hell. Could you
 tolerate being tolerated in this way?
 So minority groups now demand approval, but that isn't what
 they get. What they get instead is putting up with. This is not al-
 ways easy to spot. Behaviorally, these groups get silence, which
 can easily be interpreted as (tacit) approval. And perhaps some-
 times silence is approval, but I think most of the time it is merely
 politeness, a thin veneer that covers over deep disagreements
 about how life should be lived - a veneer that slips away when
 members of the group in question aren't around. This silent
 putting up with is unacceptable because it is dishonest, disre-
 spectful, and patronizing. It is hard to get used to the idea that the
 way to show respect for someone's way of life is not by being
 silent, but by telling that person why you find it unacceptable.
 Nevertheless, I think that open critical engagement is what re-
 spect for difference demands.
 Putting up with masquerading as approval is the real problem
 created by the atmosphere of political correctness that dominates
 many of our social institutions - especially univer-
 sities - these days. Political correctness produces
 silence in the face of disagreement. Because the
 stance of the institution may be approval rather
 than tolerance, the silence of the members who
 comprise the institution is often interpreted as ap-
 proval as well. But it isn't, at least not always, and
 while all may appear harmonious on the surface,
 deep disagreements simmer beneath it. And efforts
 by institutions to curb the way members of differ-
 ent groups talk to and about one another only fur-
 ther encourage the silence. There is a double irony
 in this institutionally enforced silence. First, the
 norms and rules that are promulgated by these in-
 stitutions are usually promulgated in the name of
 "respect for difference," but what they actually
 produce is the disrespect that putting up with im-
 plies. Second, the institutions that promulgate re-
 spect for difference characteristically also encour-
 age their members to seek a multicultural
 education- - to come to know deeply, and thus ap-
 preciate, the way different people live. But in an
 atmosphere of enforced silence, multicultural edu-
 cation seems pointless. If students were taught that
 the way to show respect is through critical engage-
 ment, and that critical engagement requires know-
 ing other ways of life deeply, they might actually
 approach multicultural education with some en-
 thusiasm. And who knows? Perhaps as people
 learned about another way of life, with the objec-
 tive of criticizing it, their
 growing understanding might
 turn tolerance into acceptance
 or celebration.
 If the way to show respect for
 people with whom one dis-
 agrees is by expressing that dis-
 agreement, why not urge society in a direction that dispenses with
 politeness and encourages truly tolerant people to say what's on
 their minds? What's the harm? The harm, alas, is substantial. As
 philosopher Charles Taylor has pointed out, human beings need
 to establish identity, an understanding of who they are - of their
 fundamental characteristics as human beings. And this identity
 will almost always include their membership in groups - in moral
 communities. But what this need for identity requires is recogni-
 tion by others. And so "a person or a group of people can suffer
 real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them
 mirror back to them a confining, or demeaning, or contemptible
 picture of themselves... misrecognition shows not just a lack of due
 respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with
 a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we
 owe people. It is a vital human need." Because of this, the de-
 mands of tolerance put people squarely on the horns of a
 dilemma. To be silent - to put up with while pretending to ap-
 prove - is to fail to give "due recognition." But to criticize can
 ACADEME May-June 1996 27
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 present people a "demeaning, contemptible picture of them-
 selves." What are we to do?
 While it would be nice to find some way to avoid this kind of
 conflictive social engagement, perhaps by replacing tolerance with
 approval, it is simply not possible. It is simply not possible for me
 to approve of committed anti-abortionists demonstrating outside
 abortion clinics. And it is simply not possible for me to approve of
 ^Jews who won't allow women to see, let alone read from the
 Torah. In a pluralistic society and a pluralistic age, deep differ-
 ences in the moral commitments of different groups of people are
 unavoidable. Unless we are prepared to abandon pluralism, we are
 stuck with tolerance.
 Tolerance and Putting Up With
 BRINGS US BACK TO THE DISTINCTION BE-
 tween tolerance and putting up with. How does this dis-
 tinction matter? Often, it's just a matter of attitude. Tol-
 erance implies an appreciation of the value of autonomy and of
 the importance of some practice to that autonomy. Putting up
 with does neither. But it isn't always just a matter of attitude. For
 example, parents put up with their adolescent child's desire to be
 a heavy metal rock musician by not getting in the way. But they
 tolerate it by helping it to happen. A college puts up with black
 separatists on campus by leaving them alone and punishing those
 who harass them. It tolerates them by giving
 them a place to meet as an organization, by pro-
 viding special services in the dean's office, by
 giving them a budget for group activities, and
 by developing courses that speak to their partic-
 ular concerns. Neither parents with regard to
 their child's musical preferences nor colleges
 with regard to black separatists need to approve
 of the practices to devote resources to them. All
 they need to do is acknowledge the importance
 of the practices to people who are pursuing a
 way of life that is worthy of respect.
 Why on earth, in the name of tolerance,
 should we feel an obligation not just to restrain
 ourselves from interfering with a practice of
 which we disapprove, but to act in a way that
 facilitates it? The answer is based not on princi-
 ples but on practicality. In a world of dramati-
 cally unequal power and control of material re-
 sources, doing nothing to get in the way is no
 better than putting up with; it is simply not
 good enough. Groups that lack resources will
 not be able to sustain themselves and their prac-
 tices without our help. If we think that what
 these groups want to do is not really morally
 significant - to be put up with, that is, rather
 than tolerated - then we owe them nothing.
 And, of course, if we think what these groups
 want to do is morally significant but /Vztolera-
 ble, then we surely owe them nothing, except
 perhaps every effort on our part to get in their
 way. But if we think that the aims of the group
 are morally significant and tolerable, then in
 the service of autonomy, authorship, and recog-
 nition, we should help them do what they want
 to do at the same time that we try to convince
 them that they shouldn't want to do it.
 The commitment to tolerate less powerful
 groups requires active support, not passive
 putting up with. Is it really possible for anyone
 actually to do this? I don't know. What I do
 know is that in a world of unequal power,
 claims of tolerance on the part of the powerful
 who do nothing to assist the powerless whom
 they tolerate have a distinctly disingenuous
 ring - so much so that the claims may them-
 selves be intolerable. &
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